

2024 Coalitions Mapping - I

South Africa

It is now widely accepted that the 2024 elections may introduce coalition governments at national and provincial levels (Gauteng in particular) – and equally widely accepted that this is going to be, at best, a mixed blessing. Markets have given up on the idea this is necessarily a positive route to reform. Given the dysfunction and instability that has engulfed many coalitions and coalition-governed municipalities, there is general concern that such disorder and uncertainty may characterise national and provincial governments after the 2024 elections. Operating on the premise that a need for coalition governments will arise in 2024, we explore various possible and realistic compositions of coalitions that may govern the country after the 2024 elections. We restrict our exploration to the national level. At this stage, our primary concerns centre on the stability of a coalition as well as the ramifications that the formation of that coalition would have for overall economic policy direction. Most possible coalitions would be a nightmare for both coalition partners and the country. The most likely coalition to assume power is that of the ANC and minority parties (including the IFP). This coalition would have the least number of contestations as smaller parties tend to lack the resources to make significant policy contributions – and policy status quo would largely continue. This is likely the first of several iterations of this report as we move towards and then after the elections.

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Preparations for coalitions in 2024

The recent surge of coalition governments at local government level is largely a consequence of the gradual but persistent decline of the nationally governing African National Congress (ANC). Political parties have learned valuable lessons about coalitions in general since the 2021 local government elections (LGEs). This is because for many parties, the post-2021 LGE political dynamics marked the first time they were engaged in and with coalitions. This is not a suggestion that the phenomenon of coalitions was only ushered in after the 2021 elections - recall the government of national unity following the 1994 national elections. In addition, Western Cape municipalities, and Cape Town in particular, have had their own struggles with coalition governments in the past. And recall the “coalition” between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC post-1999 elections, especially in KZN.

The post-2021 LGE coalition governments have been characterised by unprecedented levels of instability. Constant government changes have become the order of the day, as Gauteng metros demonstrate. In preparation for next year’s elections, parties are devising coalition strategies partly aimed at preventing the instability of coalition-governed municipalities from spilling over to the national and provincial levels. Chief among these is the DA’s “Moonshot Pact”.

The United Democratic Movement (UDM) has also proposed the formation of a new alliance, to provide more competition for the ANC and its tripartite alliance. This alliance would be registered as a party to contest elections on behalf of all the partners. It would have a committee of stakeholders, that

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would serve as a steering committee with the responsibility, among others, to develop a name, logo, colours, vision, mission, and core principles.¹ Meanwhile, the ANC has developed a coalitions framework to guide how the party approaches coalitions at local government level. The framework will see the office of the secretary-general taking over the responsibility of engaging other parties on coalitions. At national level, the party hopes to retain a majority in 2024. However, it is important to note recent comments, especially from the party's head of political education David Makhura on coalitions generally. The party is considering the introduction of legislation limiting the number of motions of no confidence that can be brought within a particular period.² This is in line with the DA's two bills aimed at stabilising coalitions. The ANC has also mandated its president, Cyril Ramaphosa, to convene a dialogue with the different stakeholders, including political parties and civil society, to discuss coalitions.³

The DA's two bills are the Constitution Nineteenth Amendment Bill and the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill. The Constitution Nineteenth Amendment Bill intends to restrict the number of motions of no confidence that can be brought against a president or premier to one every 12 months. However, the bill proposes that this restriction may be transgressed under extraordinary circumstances such as the violation of the Constitution or law, misconduct or the inability to perform the functions of office.

The Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill intends to do the same but for mayors, deputy mayors, speakers, and whips. While both the ANC and the DA seem to agree on the need to regulate coalitions, the differences may be on specifics such as the permitted number of motions within a specific timeframe. In addition, the DA intends to introduce two other bills, one aimed at introducing a threshold for parties to gain seats in councils. This is mainly a reaction to how small parties have become central to a coalition government assuming and holding on to power. Again, the ANC seems to agree with the DA on this.

Efforts to legislate coalitions would undoubtedly arrest the instability that has engulfed many coalition-governed minimalities. However, they go against the spirit of the party-list proportional representation (PR) system that South Africa uses at national and provincial levels and the mixture of the PR and constituency-based electoral system that is used at local government level. These systems cater for the representation of minorities in society, something that introducing thresholds for seat allocation may stifle. Moreover, the efforts to legislate coalitions highlight the inability of parties to form and maintain sound coalitions. These efforts also appear to be self-serving as they cater for the interests of the ANC and the DA. We would not be surprised if the first two bills are passed after some amendments from the ANC, whose support is required for these to become law.

The challenge with adopting frameworks to guide a party's approach to coalitions is that they restrict flexibility and may alienate partners or potential partners as they are restrictive. A case in point is how the ANC transgressed its

¹ Bantubonke Holomisa. 2023. "'Let's win SA back from the state capturers". Discussion document in preparation for the United Democratic Movement's National General Council". UDM. https://udm.org.za/ud/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/20230428_DiscDoc_the-Road-to-a-National-Council-2023-by-Bantu-Holomisa-HolB-MbeM-WarJ.pdf

² Ndaedzo Nethonzhe. 2023. "ANC NEC mulls introducing law to manage coalition governments". <https://ewn.co.za/2023/04/23/anc-nec-mulls-introducing-law-to-manage-coalition-governments>

³ Ndaedzo Nethonzhe. 2023. "ANC open to coalitions with all parties if they are aligned to its principles". <https://ewn.co.za/2023/04/24/anc-open-to-coalitions-with-all-parties-if-they-are-aligned-to-its-principles>

newly adopted framework to aid the election of Al Jama-ah's Kabelo Gwamanda as the mayor of Johannesburg on 5 May. The framework stipulates that the party with the highest number of votes should lead the executive. However, Gwamanda, whose party only has three seats in council was elected with the help of the ANC, Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Patriotic Alliance (PA) and other smaller parties. As per the directive of the framework, the ANC-EFF bloc's candidate was supposed to be an ANC member. However, the challenge for the ANC was that adhering to the framework would have resulted in the party losing the support of its coalition partners such as the EFF, which would have probably resulted in the coalition losing power in the City of Johannesburg. This demonstrates a need for a party's formal approach to coalitions to be cognisant of existing agreements and conditions in each municipality. The difference at national and provincial levels is that there are no existing coalitions. As a result, frameworks may be relatively easier to implement.

Potential coalitions in 2024

In the table below, we highlight possible coalitions that could govern the country in 2024. We also summarise the following: policy implications that could result from their ascendance; how stable they would be which is an important factor as their instability may very well affect the functioning of government and overall political stability in the country; the probability that the said coalitions could ascend to power; and the election outcome which would most likely result in the different coalitions assuming power. The latter factor is framed more in terms of how the ANC would perform rather than how each and every party would perform. This list of potential coalitions is not exhaustive. However, it considers some of the more realistic potential coalitions, as going through all potential coalitions is not feasible in this note.

Table 1: Coalition scenarios

Coalition partners	Coalition stability	Policy implications	Probability	Elections outcome
ANC-minority parties (Cope, PA, ATM, GOOD, etc)	Stable. Parties content with playing second fiddle to the ANC, except perhaps the PA.	Status quo. Overall policy direction to be driven by the ANC. Smaller parties compensated through government positions, hence restricted policy involvement.	High	ANC between 45% and 50%
ANC-EFF	Stable, for as long as the EFF is happy which may not last long.	EFF tactfully steering the ANC towards its socialist/nationalist policies, eg EWC, insourcing, SARB etc. Significant negative market impact.	Medium	ANC between 40% and 45%
ANC-IFP	Nationally stable; contestations in KZN given local dynamic.	ANC having the upper hand in policy debates with IFP taking smaller Ministries	High -	ANC between 45% and 50%
DA-opposition parties (ActionSA, IFP, FF+, ACDP etc)	Unstable – DA risks sticking to the letter of agreements and falling out with partners.	Adoption of liberal and market friendly policies possible but hard to implement against old machine and unstable coalition.	Low -	ANC below 35%
ANC-DA	Unstable – DA style jars with ANC plus corruption issues	Messy, to be characterised by constant contestation, eg on NHI.	Low +	ANC between 40% and 50%
EFF-DA	Unstable – lack of common cause	Messy, to be characterised by constant contestation, especial on race-related issues.	Very Low	ANC below 40%
Government of National Unity	Unstable – too many divergent personalities and approaches	To be characterised by power struggles and incessant squabbling.	Low -	ANC below 40%

ANC-minority parties (Cope, PA, ATM, GOOD etc)

Although it would not be always harmonious, this would be the least internally confrontational coalition.

The ANC has already established a working relationship with different minority parties, including the Congress of the People (Cope), the Patriotic Alliance (PA), the African Transformation Movement (ATM), GOOD and others. The ANC is already working with Cope in Gauteng metros, most notably in Johannesburg where Cope occupies the position of council speaker despite only having one seat in council. That Cope split from the ANC makes a coalition between the two much more plausible. Despite a somewhat unstable relationship characterised by threats, the PA is working with the ANC in several municipalities including Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, Nelson Mandela Bay, and Beaufort West. The ATM also has a good relationship with the ANC in Gauteng municipalities, as signified by the election of its councillor as the mayor of Mogale City in April 2023 with the help of the ANC and the EFF. Likewise, GOOD has a working relationship with the ANC in Gauteng metros. However, most significantly the party's leader, Patricia de Lille, has served as a minister in the Ramaphosa administration since 2019. This gives GOOD a degree of government experience at national level.

Three of the four parties mentioned above are already represented in the National Assembly (NA), only the PA is not. We must however indicate that parties such as Cope may very well lose seats (it only has two) in 2024 given internal challenges the party has faced recently. Meanwhile, the PA probably has shown greater potential for growth in 2024 than any of the other three, if by-election results are considered. The party has also occupied a couple of mayoral seats since 2021, including in Beaufort West, Central Karoo District, and Ditsobotla. Nonetheless, the PA presents the biggest challenge in this coalition, which would be relatively easy to manage for the ANC. The PA's leadership has proven to be very ambitious and insistent on compensation in the form of executive positions for its support. In addition to the PA, the ATM may present a challenge for the ANC at national level, given its anti-Ramaphosa stance as evidenced by its role in pushing for the president to account for his role in the Phala Phala saga.

Overall, the coalition would be stable as the partners would likely allow the ANC to "govern" and determine the policy agenda. Compensation for parties would be in the form of insignificant ministries and possibly some patronage. As such, we would expect the status quo, in terms of policy agenda and direction, to be retained.

- Energy: the ANC would be in the driving seat. Electoral decline for the party may result in reluctance to fast-track the energy transition, especially in provinces such as Mpumalanga.
- Fiscal: high levels of government involvement in the economy, coupled with exerted efforts to utilise government resources to create job opportunities for the coalition's constituency.
- Logistics reform: the coalition may very well hamper reform efforts as the status quo (ie road freight dominance) may serve rent seeking and extraction purposes well.

The coalition is the most likely to ascend to power in 2024 should there be a need. Should the ANC receive between 45% and 50% of the vote, it would likely resort to forming a coalition with these parties, many of which would be keen to be part of a governing coalition given that their chances of winning an outright majority in the foreseeable future remain very slim.

ANC-EFF

The EFF would bulldoze its way to key institutions while a limping ANC accedes to its demands and pressure. This would generate significant negative market reaction.

The ANC and the EFF have established a relatively successful partnership especially in Gauteng, where they have been able to wrestle various municipalities from the DA and its coalition partners. Examples include Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni, West Rand District, Mogale City and Tshwane where the two parties with the help of others managed to elect an ATM speaker, and temporarily, a Cope mayor. The two parties have also been developing a partnership in KZN as the EFF's decision to vote against the motion of no confidence against the mayor of eThekweni in February demonstrates. At the centre of this new relationship is the leadership of the ANC in Gauteng, in particular provincial chairperson Panyaza Lesufi who has not hidden his intention to reclaim municipalities not governed by the ANC in the province. In addition, deputy ANC president Paul Mashatile is keen on building a relationship with the EFF to minimise the risk of the ANC being removed from power. However, not all ANC members are keen on the ANC-EFF relationship. That said, even this section of the ANC still views the EFF as a better alternative to the DA.

Despite the fact that the EFF is the brainchild of former ANC members and the relationship at local government level, cooperation between the two parties at national level would be difficult, not because of the lack of will or major policy differences but rather approach to policy-related issues. The EFF has a very rigid and stern approach to policy formulation and implementation while the ANC often displays a comparatively casual approach, which sometimes leads to ambiguity. At national government level, parties tend to focus on policy issues much more than they do at local level. We therefore can expect the EFF to push for the implementation of some of its policies including expropriation of land without compensation, nationalisation of mines, banks, including the South African Reserve Bank, and other strategic sectors of the economy. To keep the EFF happy, the ANC would have to accede to such demands, which would be difficult for it. As such, this coalition would always be on the verge of collapse and would thus be a source of instability. The EFF has on various occasions demonstrated its ability to drive a policy agenda even with minimal power.

- Energy: we would expect some anti-independent power producers (IPPs) rhetoric from the EFF, but not total opposition to the transition. Notwithstanding, the coalition's (especially the EFF's) focus would be on the impact the transition would have on workers employed in the coal sector. Should we move closer towards ending loadshedding, energy may not be of much importance to the coalition.
- Fiscal: heavy reliance on government spending to pursue some of the more populist promises made to voters.
- Logistics reform: interest in revitalising rail transport without clear plans. The EFF may hinder relationships aimed at doing exactly this between Transnet and the private sector.

Generally, the ANC would attempt to keep the EFF out of important policy spaces. However, the party would not succeed as the EFF would not be content with just occupying insignificant ministries. The anti-status quo approach of the EFF would not bode well for the stability of the country. Moreover, the EFF would be emboldened by the ANC's desperation to hang

on to power. This coalition may thus be detrimental to the socioeconomic health of the country.

ANC-IFP

Could be stable however KZN dynamic between the parties would infect national possibly.

After the 2021 elections, the ANC and the IFP reached a governance agreement which would have seen the party with the highest number of votes of the two in a municipality take control of that municipality in KZN.⁴ The second largest party would be the official opposition. The two parties would help one another elect mayors in hung municipalities in KZN where either of them had the highest number of votes but not a majority. Since this was not a formal coalition, the IFP remained open to negotiations with parties seeking to form part of a governing coalition in municipalities in which it had the highest number of votes. However, a few days later this agreement collapsed, leading to both parties seeking the support of smaller parties to form governments. Importantly, the agreement between the ANC and IFP was reached with the help of both parties' national leadership, including ANC president Cyril Ramaphosa and IFP president emeritus Mangosuthu Buthelezi and current president Velenkosini Hlabisa.

It is worth noting that the ANC and IFP have worked with each other before despite a past that is characterised by a turbulent relationship. Buthelezi served as the Minister of Home Affairs in Nelson Mandela's Government of National Unity between 1994 and 1999. He retained this position in Thabo Mbeki's cabinet between 1999 and 2004. Fast-forward to 2023, there are suggestions that the two parties could work together once more nationally. Like the collapsed 2021 agreement, any pact to work together would be formed at national level, where the two parties enjoy a better relationship than at provincial level, especially in KZN. The IFP in KZN is less keen on working with the ANC than the national leadership. The two parties are bitter rivals in the province and given recent by-election results, the IFP is preparing itself to battle the ANC for control in KZN in 2024. Even in 2021, many sections of the IFP in the province were not willing to work with the ANC in any way despite the national agreement. The challenge for the national leadership of the IFP is that its KZN structure is very influential in the party, given the party's performance in the province compared to other provinces. The coalition would therefore face fierce rejection from the IFP in KZN. That said, the IFP is closely controlled by Buthelezi, and should he wish to see the coalition come into existence, he would be able to get the KZN leaders to toe the line.

Despite all the above, an ANC-IFP coalition remains very likely in 2024 especially if the governing party were to decline to 45-50%. This may seem unthinkable given the fact that the IFP is in coalition with the DA in many parts of KZN and in Gauteng metros. However, such is not enough to prevent the formation of a coalition between the IFP and the ANC. The recent disintegration of the DA-led coalition in the City of Johannesburg which resulted in the DA's former partners, including the IFP, voting for an ActionSA candidate, Funzi Ngobeni, instead of the DA's Mpho Phalatse in the contest for the city's mayorship is noteworthy. The IFP remains a small organisation without much presence outside of KZN. As such, we would not expect it to steer the ANC towards a new policy direction, despite its sternly liberal

⁴ Paddy Harper. 2021. "IFP-ANC agreement breaks deadlock in 21 hung KwaZulu-Natal councils". *Mail & Guardian*. <https://mg.co.za/politics/2021-11-17-ifp-anc-agreement-breaks-deadlock-in-21-hung-kwazulu-natal-councils/>

economic posture. Therefore, despite some sharp policy contrasts such as the IFP's advocacy of a reduced role for the state in the economy versus the ANC's state-centric approach, the IFP would not be able to exert its policy agenda given capacity constraints.

In summary, the IFP is fiscally conservative. As such, it calls for the privatisation of Eskom. While advocating the usage of renewable energy sources, the party also mentions the need to consider nuclear. The same approach in favour of privatisation in the logistics sector would prevail. However, the IFP would not have much power to ensure that these policies were implemented. We therefore would expect the ANC to have its way.

DA-opposition parties (ActionSA, IFP, FF+, ACDP etc)

This would work but would be under constant threat of being toppled especially by the DA sticking to letter of coalition agreements, ultimately unstable.

The DA already has a working relationship with ActionSA, the IFP, the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and other minority parties in several municipalities across the country. Should it be formed at national level, this coalition would be relatively stable as many coalitions in which some or all of these parties have participated have demonstrated. The key ingredient for this coalition in many municipalities has been the willingness of partners to allow the DA to lead. This has seen limited incidents of intra-coalition squabbling. The biggest challenge for this coalition would be its vulnerability to being overthrown by opposition parties or coalitions. This vulnerability has been demonstrated on numerous occasions in Gauteng metros. The coalition's best chance of being formed and serving a full five-year term would be under circumstances where the ANC receives 40% or less of the vote. Without this assurance, this coalition would collapse as opposition parties would likely politically outplay it. This would engender the same instability that we have witnessed in Gauteng metros at national level. We therefore do not see this coalition taking power in 2024 given the extreme conditions required for that to happen.

The other challenge for the coalition would be the fractures that are starting to emerge in Gauteng metros. In Johannesburg, the coalition has collapsed. This was highlighted by how the DA fielded Phalatse while ActionSA, with the backing of the IFP, the ACDP, the FF+ and the United Independent Movement (UIM), fielded Ngobeni for the Johannesburg mayorship on 5 May. Both candidates lost as Al Jama-ah's Kabelo Gwamanda was installed by the ANC-EFF bloc. In Ekurhuleni, the coalition also collapsed as its mayor, Tania Campbell was ousted. ActionSA abstained from voting when the DA contested chairperson positions for Section 79 committees, while it supported the candidatures of the ACDP, IFP, and FF+. This was mainly in retaliation to the DA's refusal to work with the PA in Johannesburg, which would have given the coalition enough votes to overthrow the ANC-EFF bloc.

The DA's "Moonshot Pact" is also not receiving as much support as many would have predicted. The parties mentioned above were expected to readily join the pact as they already work with the DA. ActionSA, which was one of the first parties to commit itself to the pact, has communicated that it is reconsidering its participation. The ACDP opposed the formation of the pact from the beginning. It must be noted that although the ACDP and the DA have a long history of working together, their relationship has not always been smooth. Recall the ACDP's withdrawal from coalitions with the DA in the Western Cape in 2009. The DA's pact is not gaining the momentum

needed to pose a threat of taking power from the ANC. Parties seem more interested in going to the 2024 elections with their focus solely on their individual performance. The apparent failure of the pact bodes well for the ANC which would be happier with an individualistic approach than a collaborative one from opposition parties. Importantly, this failure signals what may happen in the future, where the ANC would profit from the failure of opposition parties to collaboratively pursue a common goal.

While the would-be coalition partners largely have similar policies, especially on the economic front, ActionSA's stance on (illegal) immigration would ignite some tension at national level. ActionSA is sternly opposed to illegal immigration, and this was one of the factors that won the party 44 seats in the City of Johannesburg council in 2021, despite being a newly established party. Apart from that, the parties would largely be in sync in as far as agreeing on a policy agenda is concerned.

ANC-DA

There is too much the parties would have to sacrifice for this to work.

That there are even suggestions of a coalition between the DA and ANC is largely because of the DA's indications earlier this year that it was assessing the option. The party was meant to conclusively decide on this during its congress held in April. However, this was not the case. Instead, the party committed itself to doing "everything" in its power to prevent an ANC-EFF coalition from taking power. "Everything" may very well include partnering with the ANC. This is why we are exploring this possible coalition here. The ANC has also not dismissed the possibility of working with the DA but highlighted some of its reservations about the DA. An ANC-DA coalition would be a marriage of convenience. For the DA, it would be to prevent a "doomsday" coalition of the EFF and the ANC, while for the ANC it would be to retain power. As such, the coalition would be very unstable as it would be characterised by constant disagreements over important policy issues, including on National Health Insurance (NHI) and land expropriation.

For both political parties, the coalition would be detrimental to their fortunes in subsequent elections. Moreover, it would nullify all their messaging strategies in relation to one another. The ANC's overarching message that the DA is racist would be hard to communicate if the two parties were to enter into a coalition agreement. The DA's overarching message that the ANC is incompetent at governing the country would not be well received if the DA opted to work with the ANC. Overall, such a coalition would be a public relations nightmare for both parties. As such we do not see it happening in 2024. Our view is partly informed by the increasingly negative language that the ANC has used in reference to the DA in recent times.

EFF-DA

A disastrous coalition marked by more disagreements than agreements.

Given prevailing political dynamics, a coalition between the DA and the EFF would be unthinkable to many. Nevertheless, the EFF has a very unpredictable way of working with other parties. The ANC and the EFF have been cooperating well in recent months. This signals some form of preparation for a coalition in 2024 should there be a need for one. Interestingly, the very fact that these two parties are currently working together may be what prevents their cooperation in 2024. In the event that these parties do not agree on major issues in municipalities where they govern together or on power sharing in the immediate post-2024 elections

period, we can expect an extreme reaction from the EFF. This includes the possibility of helping the DA to form a government. The EFF has shown that it does not simply withdraw from partnerships following disagreements, but it “punishes” its erstwhile partners. For the ANC, the most severe form of punishment would be backing a party such as the DA to prevent it from retaining power.

An EFF-DA coalition would therefore be a product of ANC-EFF disagreements. Consequently, the coalition would be highly unstable. First, because there would be no prior agreements in place to ensure full cooperation between the parties. Second, because the two parties are ideologically worlds apart. Policy formulation and implementation would thus be a spectacle of disagreements between the two parties, one which is liberal and the other which is socialist. Moreover, for the coalition to be successfully formed the ANC would have to decline significantly, probably to under 40%. This is unlikely in the 2024 elections. What is therefore more realistic is for the EFF to form part of a multiparty coalition, that includes the DA. Even this is unlikely hence we do not see a DA-EFF coalition being formed after next year's election.

Government of national unity (all parties)

This would not work given the present conditions.

A government of national unity (GNU) comprising all parties represented in the NA would be difficult to form. Moreover, it would be messy as parties would not be bound together by common interests but access to power. It is this pursuit of access to power that would render the coalition unstable, as it would be difficult to keep all parties happy at all times. Moreover, the involvement of many parties in government would induce the same instability we have witnessed in municipalities that have been governed by bloated coalitions. Furthermore, a GNU is unlikely to receive the support of parties such as the DA, which has made its intentions to keep minority parties out of power clear. A GNU would be characterised by competition for power meaning that not much would be done in terms of governance. We therefore do not see it being formed in 2024.

Conclusion

Next year's elections undoubtedly present the first realistic opportunity for opposition parties to assume power since the advent of democracy. However, we must remain cognisant of the reality that it is highly unlikely that the coalition that would assume power next year would exclude the ANC. The decline of the ANC will not be an event, but it will continue to happen gradually. As such, we must expect the ANC to form part of the governing coalition, should there be one next year. We foresee the ANC dropping to between 45% and 50% in 2024. As such, the coalition that is most likely to be formed will include the ANC and smaller parties. To minimise the number of coalition partners, the ANC may look towards the IFP and the EFF. It is for this reason that the probability of an ANC-IFP coalition is only second to that of the ANC and smaller parties. The third most probable coalition would be that of the ANC and the EFF. Apart from these three, other coalitions have low chances of coming into existence. Moreover, many of them would be characterised by high levels of instability that would severely hinder service delivery. With international relations, and foreign policy in particular, becoming increasingly contentious, the country can ill afford to have frequent changes of governments nationally. This is because South African

political parties hold divergent views on central foreign policy issues, which would engender further uncertainty in the country's foreign policy.

An important consequent of coalitions at national level would be the rise in the significance of policies in South African politics generally. Parties have gotten away with sketchy policy offerings because policy debates in South African politics have been minimal as elections have generally been decided on other factors. Energy, fiscal, and logistics reform policies are the ones we need to pay significant attention to. The overall well-being of the country is heavily dependent on these. As coalitions become entrenched in the system, there will be a need for parties to flesh out their policies, especially in relation to the above. As far as 2024 is concerned, we expect the policy status quo to remain in line with our expectation that the next coalition government will be led by the ANC. Loadshedding, coupled with the ANC's loss of electoral support may frustrate efforts aimed at realising a speedy energy transition. Attempts to fulfil electoral promises such as job creation, may add further strain on the fiscus while logistics reform may be hampered by vested interests in road freight that an ANC-minority parties coalition may give rise to.

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